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The EU is presently engaged in enlarging and negotiating 
or implementing a variety of trade agreements, which may 
be unilateral, bilateral, regional or multilateral in nature. 
The common market organisation (CMO) of sugar is a 
good example of the interactions between the different 
trade agreements. 
The EU sugar regime and trade agreements 
The reform of the EU sugar regime will affect not only 
the EU member states and candidates for accession, but 
also countries that are associated with the EU through 
preferential, regional and multilateral trade agreements. 
For several decades, the EU has supported and protected 
the EU sugar sector. Sugar from developing countries will 
not be able to enter the EU sugar market without 
preferential trade agreements. There are two unique 
features of the trade concessions in the EU sugar regime: 
sugar under preferential import quotas can enter the EU 
market duty free and the price paid for sugar equals the 
high EU price for sugar.  
One crucial issue for the African, Caribbean and Pacific 
(ACP) countries is whether the EU will continue the 
ACP/EU Sugar Protocol after the end of the Cotonou 
Agreement in 2008. The Sugar Protocol explicitly states 
that the EU undertakes for an “indefinite period” to 
purchase and import, at guaranteed prices, specific 
quantities of cane sugar originating from the ACP 
countries. But the European Commission is currently 
examining options for reforming the sugar regime, most of 
which involve substantial cuts in the EU's guaranteed 
price. For instance, the ACP countries’ income from sugar 
exports will be reduced by more than  €200 million per 
year with a 25% cut in the EU sugar intervention price. 
The worst scenario for the ACP countries would be the 
abolishment of the Sugar Protocol. Those ACP countries 
that are dependent on this trade preference will be gravely 
affected. According to the Australian Bureau of 
Agricultural and Resource Economics (ABARE), the 
removal of the Sugar Protocol would be harmful for the 
employment prospects of poorly educated rural farm 
employees with possible negative social consequences in 
Fiji, a classic beneficiary of the Sugar Protocol. A further 
example is Guyana where preferential sugar contributes to 
20% of its total GDP and over 50% of its agricultural 
production. Moreover, the sugar industry directly and 
indirectly employs 26,000 workers who provide a living 
for 150,000 people out of a total population of 750,000. 
Guyana’s sugar industry and the livelihood of the rural 
poor will most probably be threatened if Guyana is faced 
with competition from the massive and dominant sugar 
industry of Brazil. Thus, the rural poor will incur the bulk 
of the burden of structural change. This will work against 
the United Nations Millennium Development Goal of 
reducing poverty and hunger. 
It has been argued that the current preferential access to 
the EU market to selected developing countries is an 
inefficient instrument for supporting the economies of 
developing countries. Moreover, there is some uncertainty 
as to who actually reaps the benefits (quota rents). It is 
argued that direct aid would be a better choice or it would 
generally serve the developing countries better to have free 
access for their products to the markets of developed 
countries. Firstly, the choice of harming some developing 
countries in order to help others should be avoided. 
Secondly, in contrast to the “banana regime”, more than 
95% of the income benefits from the high EU price for 
sugar accrue to the developing countries while sugar  
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traders receive less than 5% of the income benefits.
1 In 
comparison, it is common knowledge that a substantial 
part (sometimes as high as 70-80%) of direct aids for 
developing countries are repatriated back to the donor 
countries with only a minor part reaching the developing 
countries. The question is how much of the aid money will 
finally reach the rural poor who are incurring the burden of 
structural change. Also, although the preferential sugar 
system may be administratively burdensome, t he 
transaction costs are minimal due the learning experience 
of several decades.
2 Finally, the theory of “survival of the 
fittest” will not help the least developed countries because 
these countries will not be able to compete with 
developing countries that already have the infrastructure 
for sugar production in place. For example, Mozambique’s 
sugar industry had been destroyed by flood and civil 
unrest. The sugar industry in Mozambique is being rebuilt 
only after preferential market access for sugar has been 
given to Mozambique under the “everything but arms” 
trade concession. The question is how to motivate foreign 
direct investment into the least developed countries 
without the incentive of preferential market access in the 
developed countries. 
The “everything but arms” initiative, which eliminates 
all duties and quotas for sugar imports from the least 
developed countries, is pressuring the EU to reform the EU 
sugar regime in order to avoid a major influx of sugar 
coming from the least developed countries. The lucrative 
EU sugar market will attract both  genuine  and  fraudulent 
                                                        
1  This information has been obtained by tracing the relevant 
financial transactions and interviewing top officials of EU 
refineries for raw sugar imports. 
 
2  Both the EU refineries and ACP countries have long-standing 
associations that manage the trade of preferential sugar. 
trade in sugar due to the high EU price for sugar compared 
to the world market price. The “safeguard cases” involving 
the Overseas Countries & Territories and Western Balkans 
have shown that the European Commission is willing to 
make use of the safeguard measures stipulated in the 
preferential market access agreements. The emerging 
question will be whether it is politically correct to impose 
the safeguard measures on the least developed countries, 
when the EU has committed itself to open its market fully 
to the world’s poorest countries or whether the EU will 
protect its domestic market due to internal pressures from 
the sugar industry and producers. The EU will have to find 
a solution to this complex situation. 
Reform of the EU sugar regime will not be easy. The 
complexities in the interaction between the different trade 
agreements and the politically sensitive issues that involve 
trade preferences for sugar will be hotly debated not only 
in the EU but throughout the world. 
* This Policy Brief is based on ENARPRI Working Paper 
No. 1 ,  The Impact of Preferential, Regional and 
Multilateral Trade Agreements: A Case Study of the EU 
Sugar Regime, Ellen Huan-Niemi and Jyrki Niemi, 
September 2003. 
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